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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit,
currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later
claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year
later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about
two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full 
Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, 
compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to
be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit. 
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Will They Take the Money and Work? 

An Empirical Analysis of People’s Willingness to Delay Claiming 
Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum  

Against the backdrop of global population aging, policymakers around the world are 
actively seeking ways to reform their nations’ Social Security systems by encouraging delayed 
retirement. Many countries have done so by requiring raising retirement ages and cutting benefit 
payouts, but this is usually a politically fraught process.1 By contrast, the present paper explores 
an alternative approach to encourage delayed claiming by offering people a lump sum. That 
is, we investigate whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit — currently 
paid in form of an increased annuity benefit — for an actuarially fair lump sum payment would 
induce people to voluntarily delay claiming and work longer.  
Under the Social Security system’s rules currently in effect, i.e., the status quo, an 
eligible individual can claim retirement benefits as early as age 62 or as late as age 70.2 His
monthly benefit paid for life depends on his earnings history and his claiming age, with a 
reduction if he claims prior to his Full Retirement Age (FRA), and an increment for deferring
claiming after that age. For someone born in 1960 or later, for example, deferring the benefit 
from age 62 to his FRA of 67 would entitle him to an increase in monthly benefits of around 43 
percent (see Table 1 below).3 Deferring claiming to age 70 would imply a 77 percent increase in 
lifetime monthly benefits. 
1 See Brown (2012) and Turner (2009) for a survey of retirement age changes and benefit adjustments around the 
world.
2 That is, the delayed retirement credit computation stops after age 69. This abstracts from any possible benefit
recomputation that could take place if the individual were to work after that age (see
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.07/handbook-0722.html)
3 For additional information on the status quo benefit formula, see http://www.ssa.gov/retirement/retirement.htm. 
The Social Security delayed retirement credit was intended to be actuarially fair at the time the law was passed; this
was consistent with average mortality tables at the time, as well as a 2.9% real assumed interest rate. In this paper 
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Despite these rewards for delayed retirement, a large share of Americans claims benefits 
and stops working around age 62.4 Several authors have offered behavioral explanations for this 
phenomenon, arguing for instance that people are persuaded to claim early due to behavioral 
framing considerations (e.g., Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell 2013). By contrast, here 
we build on our previous theoretical paper on life-cycle portfolio choice and claiming 
behavior (Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2013). There we demonstrated that rational 
consumers would, in fact, optimally delay claiming their benefits when offered the chance to 
receive their delayed retirement credits as a lump sum payment, instead of an increase in 
lifetime annuity benefits. The present study seeks to put that hypothesis to a test by 
empirically evaluating who and how much people might defer claiming for a lump sum in lieu 
of a higher monthly payment for life. 
To do so, we have developed a survey of U.S. residents within the framework of RAND’s 
American Life Panel (ALP), and used it to assess how people might actually respond to having
access to the present value of the benefit increases resulting from longer work lives. We first 
compute each respondent’s anticipated monthly Social Security benefit if he claimed at each age 
from 62 to 70, which are, respectively, the earliest and the latest claiming ages under the status 
quo system rules. Then given this information, we ask each individual to report his expected 
claiming age (i.e., the Status Quo claiming age). Next, we present each respondent with two 
alternative scenarios, and we again ask him to report his expected claiming age under both 
options. In one case, he is told to assume that he would receive lifelong monthly income in the 
we assume the same real interest rate. As Shoven and Slavov (2012) note, in such a case the delayed retirement 
credit will be better than actuarially fair for most people, thus embodying additional incentives to defer retirement.  
Several studies have examined claiming patterns under the existing Social Security rules; see Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2005); Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011); Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2013) and 
Shoven and Slavov (2012). Other authors have taken a behavioral finance perspective to examine whether people 
might be willing to give up some of their benefit stream in exchange for a lump sum; however they do not link this 
to continued work; see Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013). 
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3
amount of his age-62 Social Security benefit from his claiming date on, irrespective of when he 
actually claimed. This benefit would be paired with a lump sum payable as of his claiming date 
(i.e., the Lump Sum claiming age), where the amount is equal to the actuarial present value of his
delayed retirement credit, i.e. the increase in lifetime retirement benefits generated by claiming 
after age 62. In the other case, he is told to assume that his monthly benefit would be adjusted 
upward for delayed claiming, until his FRA as under the status quo. For claiming ages later than 
that, his monthly benefit would be fixed at the FRA level, and he would receive a lump sum
payable as of his claiming date (i.e., the Delayed Lump Sum claiming age) equal to the present 
value of the delayed retirement credit after the Full Retirement Age.5 Moreover, in each scenario 
we ask the respondent to record how much additional work he would engage in, depending on 
the specific scenario.
Our findings show that people would voluntarily work longer if they were offered an 
actuarially fair lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. The 
delays in claiming are about half a year on average if the lump sum is paid on claiming after age 
62, and about two-thirds of a year if the lump sum is paid only for those claiming after their Full 
Retirement Age. Moreover, those most responsive to these incentives turn out to be those who 
would claim early under the status quo. We also find that people would voluntarily work about 
one-third of the delay in claiming time in the Lump Sum scenario, whereas they would work 
almost half of the additional time in the Delayed Lump Sum scenario. To the extent that workers
can be incentivized to voluntarily delay retirement in exchange for lump sums, they will also pay 
Social Security payroll taxes for additional years which could help the system’s solvency. 
5 This scenario is not the same as the “File and Suspend” approach currently permitted under Social Security rules 
(www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/suspend), where a worker can file for a benefit at or after the FRA, and suspend his
payment. Later, he can then retroactively begin his benefit payment as of the filing data and receive a lump sum for 
benefits foregone. This is not equivalent to our scenario because the “File and Suspend” lump sum is backward-
looking and it is not related to the delayed claiming adjustment that we focus on here. 
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Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that continued labor force participation results in 
improved physical and mental health among the elderly, which could improve both 
individual quality of life, as well as the financial status of healthcare systems such as 
Medicare and Medicaid (Sahlgren 2013).  
In the Social Security context, we are not the first to suggest that lump sum benefits could 
be used to replace the delayed retirement credit under Social Security (Orszag 2001; 
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross 1999). Nevertheless, neither previous study examined how the 
claiming decision differs from the work effort decision, nor did they examine which individuals 
might be more likely to change behavior given the opportunity to take a lump sum. Here we do 
both, using a nationally representative sample of the American population to test hypotheses.  
Study Design 
We use the American Life Panel (ALP) to implement our field experiment designed in a 
survey setting. This is a nationally representative sample of 6,000 households regularly 
interviewed over the Internet.6 We designed and implemented our module on a subset of 2,451 
respondents, age 40-70, in which we ask them a number of questions regarding their economic
and demographic status. Following Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013), we then take the 
respondents through a set of earnings history questions and feed these into a benefit calculator
provided by SSA.7 This generates each individual’s “Primary Insurance Amount” (PIA), which 
access with either a laptop and Internet access, or a so-called WebTV that allows them to use their television to
participate in the survey. That improves the nationally representative nature of the panel. More on how ALP
respondents are recruited is available on the American Life Panel website: https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php/. 
subperiods; in each of these, we asked average earnings and years when the respondent did not work for pay. This
generated a constructed earnings history which could be fed into the SSA calculator, which is available on the SSA’s
website at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/anypia/anypia.html. For additional details see Brown, Kapteyn, 
and Mitchell (2013).  
6 One of many advantages the ALP has over other online panels is that it provides respondents who lack Internet 
7 Specifically, we ask the respondent his age when he started working and divided the remaining years into
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
     
  
  
    
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
   
5
is the monthly benefit amount for life (adjusted for inflation) that he would receive if he were to 
claim at his FRA. To compute benefits for earlier or later claiming ages, we apply SSA’s 
actuarial adjustment factors. Specifically, claiming prior to the FRA results in a benefit reduction
of 5/9 percent per month for the first 36 months, and 5/12 percent per month thereafter until age 
62. Claiming after the FRA boosts benefits by 8/12 percent per month up to age 70. One’s FRA 
depends one’s birth year: it is age 66 for workers born 1943-1954, rising gradually to age 67 for
the 1960 and later birth cohorts. Table 1 depicts the impact of claiming age on Social Security 
benefits, for someone whose FRA is currently age 67.      
Table 1 here 
Having done so, we ask each individual the following question to survey his expected
claiming behavior under the status quo rules: 8,9 
In the next few questions, we are going to ask you to make a number of choices
about Social Security benefits. Please assume that all amounts shown are after tax 
(that is, you don’t owe any tax on any of the amounts we will show you). Think of
any dollar amount mentioned in this survey in terms of what a dollar buys you
today (because Social Security will adjust future dollar amounts for inflation). 
For the sake of these questions, assume that you are currently age 62 and
single. You are thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit. 
The Social Security system allows you to claim your benefit anytime between age
62 and 70. On average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make 
money no matter when people claim their benefit. If you claim your benefit at age 
62, you will receive an estimated monthly amount of ${SocSec62benest}10 for life.
Please answer the following questions about the choice you would make.
Now imagine you have the following choice: 
Either 
- You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $ 
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life.  
Or
8 Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013) report that respondent expectations about claiming ages and actual claiming 
behavior are highly correlated in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
9  See Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix for screenshots of the questions as presented to the participants.
10 The variable {SocSec62benest} represents our estimate of each respondent’s estimated lifelong monthly social
security benefit when claimed at age 62. We calculate this by adjusting the PIA back to age 62 from his FRA, using
the appropriate adjustment factors which depend on his year of birth (see 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/quickcalc/earlyretire.html). 
       
      
 
 
 
  
     
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
       
6
- You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive a higher 
monthly payment from that age on for life. 
Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you 
claim your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim
your Social Security benefit? 
The respondent is asked to click his mouse on a scale that represents the alternative 
claiming ages in monthly steps from age 62 to age 70. When he clicks on the scale, he is then 
shown his selected claiming age as well as the corresponding monthly benefit he will receive for 
life from age onward. Finally, he has the opportunity to change that selected claiming age or
submit his response.11 
11 If a respondent indicated he believed he would never receive Social Security because of a short earnings hist
(fewer than 10 years), we used HRS data to impute to him a PIA for someone with similar age, sex, and education
and marital status as in Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell (2013). If the respondent indicated he thought th
the system would not be around to pay him benefits, we asked him to assume it would for the purposes of th
analysis.
Subsequently, we ask each respondent about his expected claiming ages under the two 
alternative monthly benefit/lump sum scenarios described above.  To this end, we compute what 
his benefits would be at alternative claiming ages, along with the actuarially fair lump sums.12
12 Specifically, the lump sum is calculated as the actuarial present value at the claiming age of the increased lifelong 
monthly retirement benefits - based on cohort-specific FRA factors according to the current Social Security rules - 
relative to the benefits by claiming at age 62 (or at the FRA in case of the Delayed Lump Sum scenario). Annuity 
factors are derived using the mortality probabilities used in the Social Security’s Trustees Report (SSA 2013). These 
are transformed into unisex rates assuming 1,000 females for 1,050 males in every birth cohort (Bell, Bye and
Winters 2008). We convert yearly to monthly rates assuming constant number of deaths per months. The interest
rate to discount future payments is 2.9% p.a. in compliance with the interest rate of the intermediate cost scenario in 
the Social Security’s Trustees Report (SSA 2013). 
 In 
the Lump Sum case, if the individual were to defer claiming from age 62, he would receive a 
lump sum at his claiming date plus monthly benefits in the amount of his age-62 benefit from 
said date for life. We present each respondent with the following question to elicit his claiming 
age under this scenario:
Next we would like to show you some different questions about Social Security 
claiming choices. As before, please assume that all amounts shown are after tax, 
and think of any dollar amount in terms of what a dollar buys you today. Again, on 
ory
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7
average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make money no matter 
when benefits are claimed.
Please continue to assume that you are currently age 62 and single. You are still 
thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit.
Now, imagine that you had the following choice:
Either 
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $ 
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life. 
Or 
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive the same
monthly payment of ${SocSec62benest} from that age on for life, plus an
additional lump sum payable at that later claiming age. 
Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you 
claim your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim
your Social Security benefit? 
Again, the respondent is shown the monthly benefit and the lump sum amount corresponding to 
the claiming age selected, and he can change or submit his selection.  
For the Delayed Lump Sum case, the respondent is told he would be entitled to status quo
benefit increments if he delays claiming to his Full Retirement Age. If he defers claiming beyond 
that age, he will receive both the FRA benefit stream for life plus a lump sum equivalent to the
actuarial present value of the delayed retirement credit under the Status Quo scenario. The 
specific language used to evaluate the claiming age in this case is as follows:  
Next we would like to show you some different questions about Social Security 
claiming choices. As before, please assume that all amounts shown are after tax, 
and think of any dollar amount in terms of what a dollar buys you today. Again, on 
average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make money no matter 
when benefits are claimed.
Please continue to assume that you are currently age 62 and single. You are still 
thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit.
Now, imagine that you had the following choice:
Either 
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $ 
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life. 
Or 
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive a higher
monthly payment from that age onward for life. This benefit will rise as you 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
8
delay claiming up to a maximum of ${SocSecFRAbenest}13
13 The variable {SocSecFRAbenest} represents our estimate of the respondent’s lifelong monthly Social Security
benefit when claimed at the FRA.
 if you claim at your 
full retirement age. However, if you claim your benefit after your full retirement 
age, you will receive that monthly payment of ${SocSecFRAbenest} for life, 
plus an additional lump sum payable at your later claiming age. 
Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you 
claim your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim 
your Social Security benefit? 
As before, the respondent is shown the monthly benefit and the lump sum amount corresponding 
to the claiming age selected, and he can change or submit his final selection. 
An illustrative case of benefit/lump sum combinations attainable under the Status Quo
scenario and the two Lump Sum alternatives appears in Table 2. Here the monthly benefit
payable to a respondent who will claim at age 62 is assumed to be $1,500. Under the Status Quo
scenario (column 1), delaying claiming to age 63 will boost monthly benefits to $1,607. If he 
defers until age 70, monthly benefits will mount to $2,657. By contrast, under the Lump Sum
scenario (column 2), claiming at age 63 will result in the same monthly benefit of $1,500, along
with a lump sum equal to $20,208 at age 63. In this scenario, when deferring to age 70, the 
monthly benefit would continue to remain constant at $1,500. The lump sum payable at age 70, 
however, would amount to almost $178,000. The Delayed Lump Sum alternative for the same 
illustrative individual is presented in Column 3. As claiming is delayed, monthly benefits 
increase as under the Status Quo (Column 1) up to the Full Retirement Age, while the lump sum 
payment is zero. When claiming at age 70, the individual receives monthly benefits equal to the 
FRA benefits of $2,143 plus a lump sum of around $79,000. 
Table 2 here
In each case we also ask how much the respondent would work under that claiming 
alternative. Specifically, the wording is as follows: 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
   
 
 
9
Given that choice, about how many hours per week, on average, would you plan 
to work from age 62 to your claiming age at {ClaimAgeString_Del_LSFRA}14? 
14 The variable {ClaimAgeString_Del_LSFRA} represents the claiming age under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario
 
chosen by the respondent.

Once more, the respondent is asked to click his mouse on the scale representing the average 
weekly work hours to his claiming age. On clicking, the respondent is shown his selected weekly 
work effort, as well as the corresponding number of months of full-time work until his claiming 
age; we compute months of full-time work by multiplying the weekly hours by the number of
weeks until his selected claiming age. As before, the respondent can change his selection before 
submitting his final answer.
In the survey, each respondent is first asked to select a claiming age under the Status Quo
scenario. Next we randomly assign respondents in terms of whether they first see the Lump Sum
or the Delayed Lump Sum alternative. Randomization in this form allows us to compare how 
claiming ages would change across the Status Quo and both lump sum scenarios, as well as to
control for framing effects across respondents.15 
15 For a more in-depth analysis of how framing affects peoples’ perceptions of claiming ages, see Brown, Kapteyn, 

and Mitchell (2013) and Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008). 

Results for Changes in Claiming Ages 
In this section, we describe respondents’ claiming ages under the Status Quo, along with the 
patterns under the two alternative scenarios. In each case we report how many months post 
age-62 the individual selected as his target. The distribution of claiming ages is depicted in 
Figure 1. Here the box plots denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, with the intermediate lines in 
each case reflecting the median; the dots indicate the mean claiming age. Claiming ages under 
the Status Quo (top bar) range from 24 and 71 months past age 62; the mean is 45 months. When 
people can receive part of their benefit as a lump sum instead of monthly payments, the 
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distribution shifts to the right, as shown by the second bar. Now people would claim 49.6 months 
beyond age 62 on average, and the difference to the mean claiming age under Status Quo is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the claiming age distribution is compressed on 
the left, implying that those who would have claimed quite young are also most likely to delay 
claiming when the lump sum becomes available. Less change is evident on the right side of the 
bar, suggesting that those claiming later under the status quo would change their behavior less. 
The final bar illustrates the pattern of claiming ages when the lump sum is available only to those
who claim after their Full Retirement Age. The mean again rises, now to 53.3 months past age 
62, with the difference vs. the Lump Sum scenario being significant at the 1% level. In other
words, the most substantial behavioral change in claiming ages occurs if people were to be given 
benefit increments up to the FRA, as now, and post-FRA, a lump sum instead of monthly benefit 
increments.
Figure 1 here 
To provide an idea of the sizes of the lump sums involved, Figure 2 reports the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentiles along with the mean values of lump sums payable given peoples’ desired 
claiming age patterns. Under the Lump Sum scenario, the mean lump sum would be $73,000, 
with a median of $64,500; at the 25th percentile, this amount would almost equal $32,000, and 
the 75th percentile value exceeds $105,000. Under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario, because 
people who delay receive higher monthly benefits, the lump sums payable for deferring past the 
FRA are lower, averaging $22,500, with a median of about $1,600. At the 25th percentile the 
value is zero, and it is just over $37,500 at the 75th percentiles. All of these values reflect the 
actuarially neutral calculations computed for each individual’s desired claim age.   
Figure 2 here 
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Table 3 provides additional detail on claiming ages for the Status Quo and our two lump 
sum alternatives, analyzing average claiming behavior for different demographic groups. Factors 
we use to differentiate respondents include proxies for their anticipated longevity including age, 
sex, and marital status (Smith and Waitzman 1997; Zick and Smith 1991); education (Brown, 
Hayward, Karas Montez, Hummer, Chiu, and Hidajat 2012); and subjective life expectancy 
(Hurd and McGarry 2002, Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004).16
16 While respondents’ current health status can also proxy for longevity expectations, we do not include this in our
 
list of controls as it is highly correlated with subjective life expectancy in our data. 

 As discussed above, our 
respondents indicate that they intend to claim 45 months post age-62 in the Status Quo setting, 
on average. Splitting the sample by demographics, we find that men, singles, those younger than 
age 62, and the better-educated all select higher claiming ages than their counterparts. 
Additionally, people with optimistic estimates of their remaining life expectancy compared to 
standard mortality tables also select later claiming ages.17
17 Variable descriptions appear in Table A1 in the Appendix.
 
  Results for the two lump sum 
scenarios tell the same story, where all groups boost their claim ages. Moreover, claim ages are 
consistently the highest under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario. 
Table 3 here 
Thus far, we have focused on showing how claiming ages change depending on the 
treatment people see, and by their demographic characteristics. Next we adopt a multivariate 
regression framework to examine how individuals with particular characteristics might change 
their behavior under the two lump sum policy alternatives, holding other factors constant. 
Results are presented in Table 4. The three left columns report patterns for the change in 
claiming ages (in months) when people see the Lump Sum scenario versus the Status Quo; the 
right three columns compare claiming ages from the Delayed Lump Sum alternative versus the 
Status Quo. For each dependent variable, the first model (columns 1 and 4) includes only those 
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factors summarized in Table 3 (sex, marital status, age, education, and whether the individual is 
optimistic regarding his life expectancy). The second model (columns 2 and 5) adds a control for 
the respondent’s claiming age selected under the Status Quo scenario. This permits us to test
whether the lump sum policy alternatives are likely to incentivize early versus late claimers 
under the current scenario to delay claiming. In the third model (columns 3 and 6), we add an
additional control for whether the respondent sees the Lump Sum treatment first (versus the 
Delayed Lump Sum treatment), as well as economic covariates: wealth (French 2005); our 
estimate of the respondent’s age-62 Social Security benefit; whether the respondent had some
other annuity; an indicator for long job tenure; and a dummy variable indicating the respondent 
had liquidity constraints (High Debt). Additionally we have indicators of peoples’ attitudes and 
preferences including risk aversion, planning horizon, financial literacy, and an indicator that the 
respondent was confident in the Social Security system’s sustainability (c.f., Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2007, and Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2013).18 
18 Table A1 in the Appendix describes how we constructed these controls in greater detail. 
Table 4 here 
Turning to results in column 1, respondent age is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that a 60 year old would claim about three months later (20*0.134) when the lump sum 
is available, compared to a 40 year old (ceteris paribus). This finding is compatible with 
empirical evidence for time-inconsistent discounting noted by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and 
Sunde (2010, 2012), who showed that people facing a short time horizon were more impatient 
than those facing payoffs in a more distant time period. This effect becomes insignificant in 
column 2, however, when we control on respondents’ claiming age under the Status Quo. This is 
partly because peoples’ ages and claiming ages are correlated (0.14). But interestingly, the 
Claiming Age SQ term is highly significant and negative, implying that those who claim early 
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under the Status Quo would delay claiming the most under the new policy. Column 2 also shows 
a positive and significant relationship between the difference in claiming ages and peoples’ 
optimism regarding their life expectancy: that is, people who expect to live longer will claim 
later, since they are more likely to live to receive the lump sum at the later age. On average our 
respondents underestimate their probability of living to later ages by 14% compared to life
tables;19
19 See Table A1. 

 accordingly, a respondent who predicted his probabilities accurately would be 
anticipated to claim about one month later (0.14*7.142).20 
20 Interestingly, the system’s finances could benefit under the Lump Sum scenario, since people expecting to live 
longer than average indicate that they would delay claiming instead of taking an early lifetime annuity based on
population rather than optimistic mortality tables (holding all else constant). It must be recalled that, in this analysis, 
people may not choose between the Status Quo versus the Lump Sum scenario. 

Overall, our estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls in 
column 3 of Table 4. There we show that the order by which the two lump sum alternatives are 
shown to the respondent has significant impact on the claiming ages chosen, indicating a potential 
anchoring effect. If the respondent first sees the Lump Sum scenario the difference between his 
expected claiming ages under the Lump Sum alternative and the Status Quo scenario is almost 4 
months smaller than in case the Lump Sum scenario was shown second. This change in claiming 
ages is comparable in magnitude to the average Status Quo versus Lump Sum difference. The 
Lump Sum scenario provides a substantial lump sum relatively early. Consequently, the 
respondent might delay claiming by only a bit. By contrast, those who see the Delayed Lump 
Sum alternative first tend to anchor initially on a higher claiming age and smaller lump sum 
amount. Accordingly, when presented with the regular Lump Sum scenario second, the 
respondent delays claiming more, although not as long as in the Delayed Lump SumWe also find 
that persons reporting being setup. debt-constrained say they will defer claiming by almost 
two months given the Lump Sum alternative (42 percent of the mean Status Quo versus 
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Lump Sum difference). Respondents who indicate they are more risk averse also claim later, by 
about a month per standard deviation above the mean risk aversion level. This might be due to a 
preference for a larger lump sum of known amount compared to a higher annuity with an 
uncertain length of payment. Financial literacy is statistically significant, positive, and
quantitatively important: that is, when presented with the Lump Sum option, someone with no 
financial knowledge would delay claiming less than the most financially literate individual, by
about 3.288 months. This finding is compatible with results in Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and 
Mitchell (2013), who showed that financially illiterate persons have a difficult time comparing 
annuities versus lump sums.21
21 Several prior studies have examined the links between cognitive abilities and financial decision making; see Fang, 
Keane, and Silverman (2008) for Medigap purchase; Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) on the use of credit; and 
McArdle, Smith, and Willis (2011) and Banks, O’Dea, and Oldfield (2010) on retirement wealth accumulation.
 Turning to the Political Trust variable, those having the most 
confidence in the Social Security system defer claiming less (by 2.556 months), a sensible 
finding in that they value the lump sum less than their more skeptical peers, who seek to cash out
of the Social Security system as much as possible and as early as possible.  
The next three columns of Table 4 replicate the previous analysis, but this time the 
dependent variable measures the change in claiming age from the Status Quo to that selected in
the Delayed Lump Sum alternative. Interestingly, age is no longer significant in column 4. Since
most respondents in our sample are younger than the FRA, they tend to more heavily discount 
the lump sum that will be paid far in the future under the Delayed Lump Sum option. By 
contrast, when they were offered early lump sum payments in the previous scenario, they were 
more impatient. This is compatible with the time-inconsistent discounting referred to above 
(Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2012). Other results in columns 5 and 6 are quite
comparable in terms of signs, significance levels, and magnitudes of estimated coefficients,
though financial literacy now has a somewhat larger impact.   
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Overall, we conclude that offering people lump sums in lieu of higher annuity payments 
from Social Security would induce reasonably substantial delays in claiming ages, by about half 
a year on average if the lump sum were paid on claiming, and by about two-thirds of a year if the 
lump sum were only payable for benefits claimed after the Full Retirement Age. Those deferring
claiming the most under both scenarios are also those who would take their Social Security 
benefits early under the Status Quo scenario. Interestingly, only a few factors seem to 
differentiate those particularly sensitive to the lump sum offers, including financial literacy
which is associated with a larger claiming delay, and confidence in the program’s 
sustainability. Additionally, the most indebted also would delay claiming to obtain the lump 
sums. Finally, people’s delayed claiming patterns do not differ by wealth levels, the presence of 
other annuities, Social Security benefit amounts, planning horizons, or expected investment 
returns. 
Results for Changes in Work Effort 
Having established that people will delay claiming more under both lump sum 
alternatives than under the Status Quo scenario, we next turn to an examination of whether
people will simply delay their benefit take-up dates, or whether they will continue to work in the 
interim. To this end, we report in Figure 3 the distribution of full-time work effort under the 
Status Quo versus the two lump sum scenarios. As before, the box plots represent the 25th and
75th percentiles, with the intermediate line in each case reflecting the median; the dots reflect the 
mean months of full-time work post-age 62 under each case. The top bar, representing full-time 
work months beyond age 62 under the Status Quo, ranges from 2 to 53 months (median 32). The 
mean is 34.8 months. The second bar, by contrast, shows that the distribution shifts to the right 
under the Lump Sum scenario, when people can receive part of their benefit stream as a lump 
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sum instead of as a monthly payment. Now, on average, people indicate they will work 36.2 full-
time months (median 35) beyond age 62; this difference of 1.4 months is significant at the 10% 
level. Moreover, the work effort distribution is now compressed on the left, implying that those 
who would work least under the Status Quo are also most likely to work more when the lump
sum becomes available. Less change is evident on the right side of the bar, indicating that
individuals who would have worked more under the Status Quo case would exhibit smaller 
increments in work effort. The final bar illustrates the pattern of work effort under the Delayed
Lump Sum scenario, where a lump sum is available only to those who claim after their FRA. 
Mean work effort again rises, now to 39 months post-age 62, 3.9 months more than under the 
Status Quo and 2.5 months more than under the Lump Sum case. These differences are 
significant at the 1% level.  
Figure 3 here 
Additional detail on work patterns under the Status Quo and two lump sum cases is 
provided in Table 5, where we again report the number of months of full-time work post age-62 
overall (row 1), and also by respondents’ demographic characteristics, i.e. sex, marital status,
age, education, and whether people were optimistic regarding self-assessed life expectancy. A 
first point to note is that, under the Status Quo, men, singles, those younger than age 62, and the
better-educated all spend more time working than their counterparts. Moreover, those who are 
optimistic about their life expectancy would also elect to expend more work effort. Second, 
results under both lump sum scenarios are similar, where all groups boost their work effort. 
Moreover, work effort is consistently the highest under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario.
Table 5 here 
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Turning to a multivariate regression framework, Table 6 helps us test whether
respondents having particular characteristics differentially change their work patterns under the 
two lump sum policy alternatives, holding other factors constant. The three left-hand columns in 
Table 6 report estimates of the impact of factors shaping changes in work effort (in full-time 
months) when people see the Lump Sum versus the Status Quo scenarios; the three right columns
compare work effort in the Delayed Lump Sum versus the Status Quo scenarios. For each
dependent variable, the first model (columns 1 and 4) includes only those factors summarized in 
Table 5 (sex, marital status, age, education, and whether the individual is optimistic regarding his 
life expectancy). The second model (columns 2 and 5) adds a control for the respondent’s work 
effort selected under the Status Quo scenario. This permits us to test whether and which lump 
sum policies will incentivize people exerting modest work effort under the current system to
devote more effort to employment. In the third model (columns 3 and 6), we add an additional 
control for whether the respondent saw the Lump Sum treatment first (versus the Delayed Lump 
Sum treatment), as well as economic covariates (wealth, age 62 benefit, whether the respondent 
had some other annuity, an indicator for long job tenure, and a dummy variable indicating the
respondent had high debt). As before, we also control for indicators of attitudes and preferences, 
including risk aversion, planning horizon, financial literacy, and an indicator that the respondent 
was confident in the Social Security system’s sustainability. (See Table A1 in the Appendix 
for further detail.) 
Table 6 here 
Results in column 1 show that respondent age is positive and significant; the estimated 
coefficient implies that a 60 year old would work three months longer (20*0.153) than a 40 year 
old (ceteris paribus). The age effect loses significance in columns 2 and 3, however, after we 
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control on the status quo work level. The Total Work SQ term is negative and highly statistically 
significant, indicating that those who work less under the Status Quo would work more under the 
new policy, and the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of our additional controls in column 3. 
We also see that, if the respondent is first presented with the Lump Sum scenario entitling him to 
a substantial lump sum relatively early, his work effort is 1.6 months less than when he sees the 
Delayed Lump Sum scenario first. This confirms our earlier finding that respondents shown the 
Delayed Lump Sum scenario first are incentivized to work more.   
The other results in column 3 confirm many of the findings from the equivalent column
in Table 4, in that only a few factors differentiate people who are most sensitive to the lump sum 
offers. Once again, given a lump sum, respondents who are very confident in the program’s 
sustainability increase their work effort less than those who distrust the system. Wealthy 
individuals will also exert less additional work effort, but the risk averse and the 
debt-constrained increase work more when offered a lump sum versus the base case. Finally, 
people’s change in work effort patterns do not differ depending on the presence of other 
annuities, Social Security benefit amounts, planning horizons, or expected investment 
returns. Results are rather similar in columns 4-6 of the table, but often coefficient 
magnitudes are somewhat smaller while having similar signs and significance levels. Those 
with most wealth are least likely to increase their work effort in the Delayed Lump Sum case, as 
they can self-finance the waiting period before claiming the lump sum.  
Overall, then, providing a lump sum option in lieu of higher annuity payments from 
Social Security would induce respondents to work more: by about 1.4 months when the lump
sum is paid for claiming after age 62, and by 3.9 months if the lump sum is payable only for 
benefits claimed after the Full Retirement Age. Relating these estimates to the findings in the
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previous section, we conclude that people would voluntarily work about one-third of the 
additional months of delayed claiming time in the Lump Sum scenario vs. the Status Quo, and
half the additional delay time in the Delayed Lump Sum scenario vs. the Status Quo. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The primary contribution of this paper is to employ empirical microeconomic data to 
examine how individuals would respond to the chance to exchange part of their Social Security 
annuities for a lump sum. We do so to test our hypothesis from a stochastic life-cycle model
commonly used to study annuitization decisions. In our nationally representative sample of 
Americans, we show that people would voluntarily work longer, on average, if they were offered 
an actuarially fair lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. Our 
prior theoretical work predicted that they would do so, and our empirical analysis using the ALP 
reinforces those predictions. 
We show that giving people lump sums in lieu of higher annuity payments from Social
Security induces reasonably substantial delays in claiming ages, by about half a year on average 
if the lump sum is paid for claiming after age 62, and by about two-thirds of a year if the lump
sum is payable only for claiming after the Full Retirement Age. Interestingly, those who are most
responsive to these incentives prove to be those who would claim early under the status quo. 
Moreover, financial literacy and mistrust in the retirement program’s sustainability are associated
with greater claiming delays; and the indebted would also delay claiming to obtain the lump 
sums. Claiming delays do not differ across wealth levels, whether people have other annuities, 
the level of their Social Security benefit amounts, their risk aversion or planning horizons, or the 
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investment returns they expect on investments. Additionally, we show that people would work 
one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. 
Our findings will interest policymakers seeking ways of reforming Social Security
without raising costs or cutting benefits, while enhancing the incentives to delay retirement. 
Boosting Social Security system solvency without cutting benefits appears to be feasible, by 
offering a fair lump sum in place of the current delayed retirement credit. As, we have shown, 
people would voluntarily extend their work effort due to the lump sum options examined here. 
This implies that some workers would pay Social Security payroll taxes for more years. At the 
same time, given the well-established decline in average labor income toward the end of the 
work life, the additional work period might add little to the lifetime earnings history on which 
Social Security benefits are based. Hence the overall solvency of the system could be enhanced. 
Additionally, from a macroeconomic perspective, incentivizing longer work lives could also 
offer additional economic resources to help cover the costs of population aging (National 
Research Council 2012), and working longer may well be associated with better mental and 
physical health (Rohwedder and Willis 2009).  
In terms of future research directions: our policy experiment was designed to be cost-
neutral to the Social Security system. That is, our approach has the virtue of not imposing 
additional solvency concerns on the system nor imposing wealth transfers on the next generation. 
It remains to be seen whether people might also be willing to delay claiming and work longer for 
smaller-than-actuarially-fair lump sums, which would enhance the system’s sustainability. 
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  Figure 1: Distribution of Claiming Ages: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives 
Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of claiming ages, with the intermediate lines at the medians. 
Black dots represent the mean claiming ages, with differences between the means in the two Lump Sum alternatives 
and the mean in the Status Quo scenario significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Lump Sum Payments under Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of lump sum payments at the claiming ages, with the 
intermediate lines at the medians. Black dots represent the mean lump sums.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Total Work Effort: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives
 80 
  
Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of months of fulltime work (after age 62), with the 
intermediate line at the median. Black dot represents the mean number of months of fulltime work, with differences 
between the mean in the Lump Sum (Delayed Lump Sum) alternative and the mean in the Status Quo scenario 
significant at the 10% (1%) level. 
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 Table 1: Delayed Claiming Boosts Monthly Social Security Benefits: Status Quo
Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67; PIA = Primary Insurance Amount. Source: www.ssa.gov. 
Claiming 
Age 
Monthly 
Benefit: 
(% of PIA) 
 
Boost with 1 
year delay (%) 
 
Cumulative boost 
compared to age 62 (%) 
 62 70
  63  75  7.14  7.14
  64  80  6.67  14.29
  65  86.67  8.34  23.81
  66  93.33  7.70  33.33
  67  100  7.15  42.86
  68  108 8  54.29
  69  116  7.41  65.71
  70  124  6.90  77.14
25
 
 
 
 
    able 2: Illustrative Benefit Impact of Delayed Claiming: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives
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Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67, Assumed Social Security Benefit at Age 62: $ 1,500. Status Quo refers to
the current Social Security system (column 1). Lump Sum (column 2) holds the monthly benefits constant at all
claiming ages; the lump sum amount payable at the claiming age in that row is the actuarial present value of the
difference in monthly benefits between the Status Quo and those paid in the Lump Sum scenario. Delayed Lump
Sum (column 3) increases monthly benefits to the FRA with no lump sum payment; thereafter monthly benefits are
constant and the lump sum is the actuarial present value of the difference in monthly benefits between the Status 
Quo and the FRA benefit. Source: Authors’ calculations.
 
Claiming  Age 
  
 (1)
 Status Quo
Monthly 
Benefit 
 
 (2)
 Lump Sum  
Monthly  +  Lump Sum  Benefit 
  
 (3)
  Delayed Lump Sum
Monthly +  Lump SumBenefit 
62 1,500 1,500 +  0 1,500 + 0 
  63  1,607   1,500 +  20,208 1,607 + 0 
  64  1,714   1,500 +  39,382 1,714 + 0 
  65  1,857   1,500 +  63,887 1,857 + 0 
  66  2,000   1,500 +  86,963 2,000 + 0 
  67  2,143   1,500 +  108,589 2,143 + 0 
  68  2,314   1,500 +  133,427 2,143 +  28,090
  69  2,486   1,500 +  156,480 2,143 +  54,428
  70  2,657   1,500 +  177,723 2,143 +  78,988
26
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
 
  
Table 3: Mean Claiming Ages (Months after Age 62) under Status Quo and Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Notes: For variable descriptions see Appendix. N = 2451. Source: Authors’ calculations.
  
   
% 
 (1)
 Status Quo
 (2)
 Lump Sum
 (3)
Delayed 
 Lump Sum
Overall Sample  100   45.0 49.6   53.3
Sex 
  Male  41.1  46.2   50.2  53.7
  Female  58.9  44.0   49.2  53.0
Marital Status 
  Married  60.0   43.7  48.8 52.3
 Non Married   40.0   46.8  50.7  54.8
Age 
 < 62   72.5  46.6   50.7  54.8
  62-70  27.5  40.7   46.7  49.4
Education 
HS Dropout  4.2  39.8   45.8  47.6
 HS Graduate   16.1  34.8   40.0  44.1
     More than HS   79.7   47.3  51.7  55.4
Life Expectancy Assessment 
  Optimistic  33.5  53.9 57.5 60.7 
  Pessimistic  66.5  40.4 45.6 49.6 
27
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Table 4: How Expected Claiming Ages Change given Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Lump Sum Delayed Lump Sum 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographic 
Male -1.25
 (0.916)
-0.89
(0.836)
-1.478*
(0.888)
-1.441
(0.899)
-1.153
(0.849)
-1.690*
(0.902)
Married 1.436 
 (0.920)
-0.055
(0.842)
-0.581
(0.877)
0.973
(0.903)
 -0.216
(0.855)
 -0.382
(0.892)
Age 0.134**
(0.055)
-0.056
(0.051)
0.016
(0.056)
0.07
(0.054)
-0.082
(0.052)
0.007
(0.057)
Education (yrs) -0.235
(0.181)
0.243
(0.167)
0.081
(0.185)
-0.237
(0.178)
0.144
(0.169)
0.071
(0.188)
Optimistic Life Exp. -2.127
(1.872)
7.142***
(1.759)
7.074***
(1.783)
-1.795
(1.839)
5.603***
(1.786)
6.288***
(1.813)
Experimental
Claiming Age SQ -0.298***
(0.013)
 -0.306***
(0.014)
-0.238***
(0.014)
 -0.246***
(0.014)
Saw Lump Sum First  -3.772***
(0.806)
 -2.223***
(0.820)
Economic 
Wealth 50-100K 1.037
(1.381)
 -0.686
(1.404)
Wealth 100K+ -0.267
(1.081)
 -1.627
(1.099)
Other Annuity -0.384
(0.887)
-0.933
(0.902)
Benefit at Age 62  0.374
(1.074)
0.902
(1.092)
Long Tenure (10y+) -0.499
(1.720)
-2.369
(1.749)
High Debt  1.925**
(0.894)
1.859**
(0.909)
Attitudes/Preferences 
Risk Aversion  1.074**
(0.426)
 0.936**
(0.433)
Long Term Planner 0.868
(0.877)
-0.11
(0.892)
Risky Investing -0.226
(1.320)
-0.631
(1.342)
High Expected Return  1.351
(1.258)
-0.273
(1.279)
High Spending  -0.048
(1.203)
0.408
(1.223)
Financial Literacy  3.288**
(1.527)
4.708***
(1.553)
High Political Trust  -2.556***
(0.860)
 -3.020***
(0.874)
R-squared 0.005 0.172 0.192 0.004 0.114 0.133
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the claiming ages in the Lump Sum vs. the Status Quo scenario
(in months). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 2451. Missing values controlled. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5: Mean Months of Fulltime Work (after Age 62) under Status Quo and Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Notes: Variable Descriptions see Appendix. N = 2451. Source: Authors’ calculations.
  
   
% 
 (1)
 Status Quo
 (2)
 Lump Sum
 (3)
Delayed 
 Lump Sum
Overall Sample  100  34.8   36.2  38.7
Sex 
  Male  41.1  38.5   40.0  42.3
  Female  58.9  32.2   33.6  36.1
Marital Status 
  Married  60.0   32.7  34.8 36.9
 Non Married   40.0   37.9  38.4  41.3
Age 
 < 62   72.5  35.9   36.5  39.5
  62-70  27.5  32.0   35.4  36.6
Education 
HS Dropout  4.2  29.5   33.5  34.9
 HS Graduate   16.1  27.3   28.3  30.9
More than HS   79.7   36.6 38.0  40.4
Life Expectancy Assessment 
  Optimistic  33.5  43.5   44.7  46.5
  Pessimistic 66.5  30.4   32.0  34.7
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Table 6: How Total Work Effort Changes given Two Lump Sum Alternatives 
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the number of months of fulltime work in the Lump Sum vs.
the Status Quo scenario. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 2451. See Appendix
for variable descriptions. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Lump Sum Delayed Lump Sum 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographic 
Male -0.129
 (0.728)
1.048
(0.689)
0.632
(0.733)
-0.164
(0.710)
0.718
(0.689)
0.281
(0.728)
Married 1.620**
 (0.731)
0.096
(0.695)
0.125
(0.725)
0.954
(0.713)
-0.188
(0.695)
0.084
(0.720)
Age 0.153***
(0.044)
0.052
(0.042)
0.121
(0.046)
0.097**
(0.043)
0.021
(0.042)
0.109**
(0.046)
Education (yrs) -0.261*
(0.144)
-0.028
(0.136)
-0.039
(0.152)
-0.317**
(0.140)
-0.142
(0.136)
-0.112
(0.151)
Optimistic Life Exp. 0.39
(1.488)
6.052***
(1.439)
6.598***
(1.467)
-0.01
(1.451)
4.232***
(1.439)
5.082***
(1.456)
Experimental
Total Work SQ -0.201***
(0.011)
-0.207***
(0.012)
-0.151***
(0.011)
-0.159***
(0.012)
Saw Lump Sum First -1.614**
(0.665)
-1.432**
(0.660)
Economic 
Wealth 50-100K -0.413
(1.138)
-2.203*
(1.130)
Wealth 100K+ -1.947**
(0.892)
-3.214***
(0.886)
Other Annuity 0.170
(0.732)
-0.414
(0.727)
Benefit at Age 62 1.135
(0.886)
1.358
(0.880)
Long Tenure (10y+) -1.153
(1.419)
-3.114**
(1.409)
High Debt 1.576**
(0.737)
1.755**
(0.732)
Attitudes/Preferences 
Risk Aversion 0.827**
(0.350)
1.036***
(0.348)
Long Term Planner 0.454
(0.723)
0.500
(0.718)
Risky Investing 0.137
(1.087)
-1.195
(1.080)
High Expected Return 0.540
(1.037)
-0.312
(1.030)
High Spending 0.649
(0.993)
0.233
(0.986)
Financial Literacy 0.994
(1.259)
2.855**
(1.250)
High Political Trust -1.701**
(0.709)
-2.027***
(0.704)
R-squared 0.008 0.119 0.133 0.005 0.071 0.098
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Table A1: Variable Descriptions
22 Objective survival probability based on the Alternative 2 mortality probabilities used in the SSA's 2013 Trustees Report (Social Security Administration 2013). 
Variable Name  Variable Description Mean Median 
Claiming Age SQ Claiming Age in Status Quo scenario (in months after age 62)  45.0  38
 Claiming Age LS  Claiming Age in Lump Sum scenario (in months after age 62) 49.6  48
 Claiming Age DLS  Claiming Age in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (in months after age 62)  53.3  60
Diff LSSQ  Difference between claiming age in Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Claiming Age LS - Claiming Age SQ) 4.6 0 
Diff DLSSQ Difference between claiming age in Delayed Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Claiming Age DLS - Claiming 
Age SQ) 
8.4 0 
 Lump Sum LS  Lump sum payment (in $) R receives in Lump Sum scenario at claiming age (Claiming Age LS) 73026  64498
Lump Sum DLS Lump sum payment (in $) R receives in Delayed Lump Sum scenario at claiming age (Claiming Age DLS)  22449  1596
Work Hours SQ  Weekly work hours in Status Quo scenario (0 for Claiming Age SQ = 0) 24.5  30
Total Work SQ Months of fulltime work in Status Quo scenario (0 for Claiming Age SQ = 0) 34.8  32
Work Hours LS  Weekly work hours in Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age LS = 0)  24.8  27
Total Work LS Months of fulltime work in Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age LS = 0)  36.2  35
Work Hours DLS  Weekly work hours in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age DLS = 0)  24.2 25 
Total Work DLS Months of fulltime work in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age DLS = 0)  38.7 36 
Diff LSSQ Work Difference between months of full-time work in Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Total Work LS - Total Work 
SQ) 
1.4 0 
Diff DLSSQ Work Difference between months of full-time work in Delayed Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Total Work DLS - 
Total Work SQ) 
3.9 0 
Male = 1 if R is male; 0 else 0.41 0 
 Married  = 1 if R is married; 0 else 0.60 1 
Age   R's age 55.6   56
Education (yrs) 
Optimistic Life Exp. 
 R's years of education
Difference between R's subjective and his objective  22 probability of living to target age [75, 80, 85], for Rs age 
 [<65, 65-69, 69+]
14.6
-0.14 
  14
-0.109 
 Saw Lump Sum First   = 1 if R saw Lump Sum alternative first; 0 if R saw Delayed Lump Sum alternative first  0.50 1 
 Wealth 50-100K  = 1 if R's household financial wealth is between $50,000 and $100,000; 0 else 0.11 0 
 Wealth 100K+ = 1 if R's household financial wealth is above $100,000; 0 else 0.42 0 
 Other Annuity  = 1 if R is/will be receiving any pension other than Social Security now/in the future; 0 else 0.51 1 
Benefit at Age 62 R's estimated monthly Social Security benefit at age 62 ($ ’000) 1.194  1.153
Long Tenure (10y+)   = 1 if R worked for pay more than 10 yrs; 0 else  0.93 1 
High Debt = 1 if R would use 50%+ of additional $10,000 to pay off credit card/other debt; 0 else  0.37 0 
 Risk Aversion Standardized (mean 0, std 1) risk aversion index, calculated as described in the online appendix of 
Brown/Kapteyn/Luttmer/Mitchell (2013). 
0.0   -0.007
 Long Term Planner  = 1 if R makes financial plans for next 5 yrs and more; 0 else 0.40 0 
Risky Investing = 1 if R would invest 50%+ in stocks/real estate; 0 else 0.89 1 
High Expected Return = 1 if R expects investment return of 7%+; 0 else 0.12 0 
High Spending = 1 if R would use 50%+ of additional $10,000 to spend; 0 else 0.15 0 
 Financial Literacy Percentage of financial literacy questions answered correctly  0.75 1 
High Political Trust = 1 if R is somewhat/very confident in the Social Security system’s sustainability; 0 else 0.55 1 
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Figure A1: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Status Quo 
Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 

months) in the Status Quo scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for monthly benefits, age and months
 
show no entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown.
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Figure A2: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Lump Sum Scenario 
Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 

months) in the Lump Sum scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for lump sum, age and months show no 

entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown. 

 
 
 
  Figure A3: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Delayed Lump Sum Scenario
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Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 

months) in the Delayed Lump Sum scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for lump sum, age and months
 
show no entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown.
 
 
 
 
 Figure A4: Online Survey Screen Shot – Work Effort under Status Quo Scenario 
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Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his work effort (24 hours per week) in
the Status Quo scenario (after having selected a claiming age of 67 years and 7 months on the previous screen). Prior
to selecting a work effort, the text boxes show no entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown. The
corresponding question regarding work effort in the two lump sum alternatives had equal wordings and design.
